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NATO's decision to modernize its intermediate-range
nuclear forces (INF) by deploying 108 Pershing II 's and 464
cruise missiles has created friction between the Soviet
Union and the Federal Republic of Germany. Following the
NATO decision of 12 December 1979, the Soviet Union staged
a monumental propaganda effort in West Germany against the
modernization, with special attention to the Pershing II 's
which are to be stationed solely on West German soil. This
effort, however, was not sufficient to cause the Federal
Republic of Germany to reject the deployment, although there
were heated Bundestag debates and massive public demonstrations
against the deployment.
Since the deployment began in November 1983, no dire
consequences have come to pass for the Federal Republic of
Germany. The Soviet Union, in fact, needs to retain positive
relations with the Federal Republic because of its need for
hard currency and Western technology, and the FRG is the
USSR's most valuable Western trade partner. Retaliatory
measures taken by the Soviets against the Pershing II 's have
only amounted to modernization measures already in progress
during the negotiations.
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I. INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND REGARDING SOVIET-WEST
GERMAN RELATIONS AND NATO'S 1979 INTERMEDIATE-
RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (INF) DECISION
In the apt words of Alvin Rubinstein, " [for] more than a
century, Moscow has alternated between fascination with and
fear of German discipline, drive, and productivity." [Ref. 1:
p. 88 J The Soviets claim to fear German "revanchism" , that
West Germany will one day become a military threat to the
Soviet Union in an attempt to regain territory lost in World
War II. For this reason the Soviet Union opposed West German
rearmament in the early 1950 's. The Soviets respect and
admire the West Germans for their efficiency and productivity,
which enabled them to reconstruct their economy after World
War II expeditiously enough to possess the fourth largest
Gross National Product in the world by 1980.
A reunified Germany, first suggested by Stalin in March
1952 possibly to kill the idea of a European Defense
Community and West Germany's integration into NATO, could in
reality only be a threat to the Soviet Union. If the
reunified Germany were neutral or Western-oriented, by its
sheer size and economic potential, it could pose either a
political or military threat to the Soviet Union; if the
reunified Germany were Communist, it might challenge the
Soviet Union ideologically as Communist China has, thus
creating a nightmare of a different sort.
The Soviet Union not only opposed the entry of the Federal
Republic of Germany into NATO in 1955 but has since opposed
any qualitative improvement of weapons stationed on its
territory. The neutron bomb and intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) are cases in point. In both cases the Soviets
undertook vast propaganda campaigns to try to stop deployment,
successfully in the first case and unsuccessfully in the
second
.
After the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations
with the FRG in 1955, Soviet Westpolitik centered on
achieving West German renunciation of any claims to its 19 37
boundaries and its recognition of the GDR as a sovereign
state.
On the West German side three distinct Ostpolitiks have
been pursued since 1955. Adenauer's Politik der Staerke
,
or policy of strength, emphasized restoration of the 1937
boundaries, reunifying Germany, integrating West Eerlin into
the FRG, and placing West Germany firmly in the Western camp
(the European Economic Community, the Western European
Union, and NATO) . The GDR was considered to be an
illegitimate state. [Ref. 2: pp. 108-109] Under Erhard and
Kiesinger, the FRG established trade missions in Eastern
Europe and other economic levers to modify Soviet Westpolitik,
pursuing a policy of "bridge building" and reconciliation
with the USSR. However, it was not until the Chancellorship
of Willy Brandt that the most far-reaching concessions were
negotiated
.
Germany was now willing to accept the loss of its 1937
boundaries and ratify the legitimacy of Eastern Europe, and
was also prepared to recognize the GDR, while retaining a
constitutional commitment to reunification ... .Brandt thus
changed the terms of the debate. He advocated resolving
the status of Germany by accepting the status quo as the
Soviets had always advocated. [Ref. 2: p. Ill]
As early as 1966, iMoscow alluded to a West German
renunciation of nuclear weapons as a basis for normalization
of Soviet-West German relations. In fact, the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty, signed by the FRG on 28 November 1969, which
renounced any right to acquire, develop, or use nuclear
weapons, was the first of several treaties and agreements
which normalized Soviet-West German relations. These treaties
and agreements included the 1 February 1970 agreement for the
FRG to provide large-diameter pipes in exchange for Soviet
natural gas deliveries over a twenty year period and the
12 August 1970 Renunciation of Force Treaty. The Federal
Republic of Germany also conformed to Soviet preferences by
concluding renunciation of force agreements with Prague and
Warsaw. By 1978, German credits and exports of an iron and
steel complex, turbines for the natural gas pipeline,
electronic equipment for petrochemical plants, trucks, and
heavy machinery had transformed West Germany into the Soviet
Union's leading Western trading partner and source of
high-technology imports. [Ref. 3: pp. 98-100]
If the 1970 's began on a high note for Soviet-West German
relations, the situation had stagnated considerably by the
late 1970' s, particularly during 1978 and 1979, when the
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Soviets became increasingly concerned about Chancellor Schmidt's
insistence on countering the threat raised by deployment of
the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missile beginning in
1977.
Although the United States withdrew its longer-range INF
(LRINF) missiles—the Thor, Jupiter, and Mace (ninety-six of
which were stationed in West Germany from 1952-1969 ) --from
Europe in the 1960 's, Western European publics, including the
West Germans, felt basically secure under the U.S. strategic
guarantee and NATO's medium-range bombers, SLBM's and tactical
nuclear weapons. This situation began to change, however, in
1977 when the Soviet Union began to deploy the SS-20, which
was viewed as qualitatively different from the SS-4's and SS-5's
it was intended to replace because of its longer range,
mobility, triple warhead, and greater accuracy. Further, the
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) codified parity between
Soviet and U.S. strategic forces, raising the question of U.S.
credibility. If the U.S. was no longer clearly superior
strategically to the Soviet Union, would it be able and, if
able, willing to protect Europe at great hazard to itself?
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt emphasized the growing disparity
in theater nuclear forces in a speech to the International
Institute of Strategic Studies in October 1977, noting that:
SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the
Soviet Union and the United States. To put it another way:
SALT neutralizes their strategic nuclear capabilities. In
Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities
between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional
weapons ... .Strategic arms limitations confined to the
United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair
the security of the West European members of the Alliance
vis-a-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do
not succeed in removing the disparities of military power
in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations. [Ref. 4:
pp. 3-4]
Just prior to Helmut Schmidt's speech, at a London summit
of NATO Heads of State and Government in May 1977, a Long-
Term Defence Program (LTDP) was conceived in order to explore,
among other topics, ways of modernizing NATO's own theater
nuclear forces (TNF) . This particular task became the province
of the Nuclear Planning Group, which is NATO's forum for
nuclear policy consultation. The Nuclear Planning Group, in
turn, established a High Level Group (HLG) to study the
modernization issue and come up with recommendations on NATO's
long-term needs. This group began its work in December 1977.
Later, as it became apparent that any steps to modernize
NATO's long-range TNF might generate requirements for arms
control, a Special Group on Arms Control was established in
April 1979. Although each group worked separately, they
did meet in September 1979 to coordinate their final reports.
[Ref. 5: pp. 4-6]
As summarized by Kelleher, the HLG ' s conclusions were
largely preordained by broad political concerns about
visibility (thus, ground- rather than sea-based) and
timeliness (the earliest possible initial operating
capabilities)
. The work of the HLG centered more on 1)
the number of forces required to offset, but not match,
Soviet deployments, a number believed to be in the 200 to
600 launcher range and 2) the best mix between Pershing II
extended-range missiles to be based in Germany alone and
GLCMs with a broader basing structure. [Ref. 6: p. 153]
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There was also the issue of nonsingularity , which was a
West German precondition for any deployment. Basically, this
meant that missiles must be based in at least one other
non-nuclear continental European state besides the Federal
Republic. Otherwise, West Germany's positive relationship
with the Soviet Union might be jeopardized by her isolation.
The studies conducted by the High Level and Special Groups
culminated in a special meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers and
Defense Ministers and a decision on 12 December 1979 to
replace existing Pershing I-A's with 108 Pershing II 's and
464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) . As an integral
part of the decision 1000 nuclear warheads were to be with-
drawn as soon as possible, and the 572 Pershing II and GLCM
warheads were to be accommodated within the reduced ceiling.
Further, Alliance members supported the U.S. decision to
begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms limitations
on INF as soon as possible to reduce or even obviate the
planned deployment. [Ref. 7: pp. 65-66]
Both systems would help fill the gap between short-range
theater nuclear and strategic weapons by providing an
additional escalatory step, particularly in the event of an
attack on NATO by Soviet SS-20's. If NATO were attacked by
the intermediate-range SS-20's, a "grey area" weapon not
covered in strategic arms negotiations, it could not respond
with its own intermediate-range and land-based missiles.
The choice would be to either use its highly vulnerable
11
medium-range fighters and bombers, its less accurate
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) , its short-range
tactical nuclear missiles (which could not reach the Soviet
Union), or the U.S. strategic missiles. Any U.S. strike against
the Soviet homeland would raise the possibility of a Soviet
strategic response not only on Europe but also on the United
States. NATO governments judged that possession of an
effective NATO intermediate-range system would not only
provide NATO with more response options but would also assure
the Europeans that the U.S. strategic guarantee was again
credible by displaying a visible deterrent on European soil
linking the United States and the Europeans in war
risk-sharing. [Ref. 8]
The Pershing II and the GLCM, with ranges of 1800 and 2500
km., respectively, are the intermediate-range counterparts of
the longer-range Soviet SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles. While
these Soviet missiles are capable of reaching all of Western
Europe, the Pershing II* s and GLCM ' s are able to reach only
the most Western regions of Soviet territory. As in the case
of the SS-20, they are mobile and highly accurate, but their
mobility differs in that they will be stationed at permanent
bases for dispersal on warning, while the SS-20* s are
frequently rotated between a multiplicity of preplanned
launch sites. Considered highly provocative by the Soviets,
who claim it could reach targets in the Soviet Union in six
minutes, the Perhsing II is described by them as a first
12
strike weapon. However, as first strike weapons, there are
too few Pershing II 's to accomplish such a purpose, and the
GLCM ' s are too slow. Moreover, the Soviets never mention
what warning time the SS-20's would allow targets in Western
Europe. Finally, it should be noted that the six minute
warning time the Soviets attribute to the Pershing II is an
exaggeration. The Federal Republic of Germany's White Paper
1983 notes that "its flying time is in the order of 12 to
14 minutes—the SS-20 missiles have for years been able to
reach any target in Western Europe in that time." [Ref. 9:
p. 216] The point is that the Soviets have just as much




II. SOVIET INF DEPLOYMENTS AND ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE FRG
DECISION-MAKING REGARDING INF
The Soviet Union has deployed longer range intermediate-
range nuclear missiles (INF) in Europe since the late 1950'
s
with its SS-4's and SS-5's, each capable of distances of up to
1,900 and 4,100 kilometers, respectively. According to Soviet
sources these longer range intermediate-range nuclear missiles
were deployed in response to U.S. forward-based submarine and
aircraft weapons systems. For example, in an interview with
La Stampa , Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the Soviet
Union Central Committee International Department, stated that
the aim of the Soviet medium-range missile deployments was to
match U.S. forward-based systems [Ref . 10: p. ii] . In a TASS
dispatch, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev
described NATO as having 857 medium-range nuclear delivery
vehicles, which include over 650 F-lll's and F-4 ' s in West
Germany and Great Britain and A-6 ' s and A-7 ' s from U.S.
aircraft carriers off the coast of Europe [Ref. 11: p. AA2].
Therefore, the Soviet Union claims that it had to deploy
approximately the same number of INF systems. Indeed, as
Nikolai Portugalov put it, "If there were no US forward-based
systems capable of reaching the Soviet Union..., there would
be no need to station a medium-range potential in the
European Soviet Union...." [Ref. 12: p. 41] The Soviet
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systems, however, have been weighted more on land-based
missiles than on aircraft--at least the way the Soviets
counted their systems. (The Soviets exclude from their
count hundreds of Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft comparable
to those they attribute to the U.S.)
A. SOVIET SS-20 RATIONALE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SOVIET
MILITARY DOCTRINE
By the mid-1970 's, the Soviets sought to improve on the
survivability, reliability, range and accuracy of the SS-4's
and SS-5's by developing the SS-20, which was mobile,
reliable, had a range of 5,600 kilometers and was accurate
to within 300 meters of a target. Thus, modernization is
given as the Soviet explanation for the development of the
SS-20.
The new, more modern SS-20' s have also been presented by
the Soviets as replacements for the aging SS-4's and SS-5's.
Viktor Vasilyev wrote for New Times that
...for every two SS-20 's deployed the Soviet Union simul-
taneously dismantled three SS-4 ' s and SS-5's. As a result,
instead of the 600 missiles it once had in Europe, it now
has only 473. The total yield of their warheads was
reduced by nearly half. [Ref. 13: p. AA7]
This passage deemphasizes by neglecting to mention, as is
the case with many other Soviet writings, that the SS-20 has
three warheads, whereas the SS-4's and SS-5's are single
warhead missiles. Thus, while their overall number of
launchers has decreased, the number of warheads has increased
15
As William Garner has stated in his recent monograph on
Soviet threat perceptions, "Soviet threat assessments of the
new NATO missiles are... based on their operational capability
to neutralize Soviet employment options", with the worst case
being NATO "achievement of military-technical superiority
through potentially decisive surprise and preemption against
3priority C I targets." [Ref. 14: pp. 61 and 74]
On the subject of a war limited to Europe, the Soviets
are quick to stress that the United States cannot get away
with launching a "strategic" attack against the Soviet Union
from Europe, a situation inherently unfair, they claim,
because they have no medium-range missiles in a position to
strike the United States. Meanwhile, the United States,
through its NATO deployments, can strike targets in the
Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, this situation is of grave concern
to the Soviets, who have invested 75% of their warheads in
their ICBM force, some of which would be at substantial
risk [Ref. 14: p. 76] . In the words of Yevgeniy Velikhov,
Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences:
We consider the Pershing missiles to be .. .outright strategic
weapons. This is not only because the Pershing missiles
could reach the cities of the Soviet Union, but also
because they are extremely accurate and could destroy
all our strategic command posts. [Ref. 15: p. AA3]
Velikhov 's argument, however, exaggerates the capabilities
of a limited number of Pershing II and cruise missiles to




In another Soviet broadcast cruise missiles were also
viewed as first strike weapons because they would be able to
hit objectives that cannot be moved in a matter of hours.
With their low altitude flight pattern, they might be
spotted only at the last minute, thus giving as little
warning time for the Soviets as the much faster Pershing II
missile would provide. [Ref. 16: p. AA4]
Even if the United States could carry out a first strike
on the Soviet Union from Europe, Gerhard Wettig of the
Federal Institute for Eastern and International Studies in
Cologne reminds the West Europeans that the SS-20's and
Backfire bombers:
...for the first time [enable] the Soviets to launch a
disarming first strike against NATO in Europe. The Kremlin's
obvious aim is to decouple the West European countries from
the USA, i.e. to render the extended American deterrence in
the European theatre ineffectual. [Ref. 17: p. 38]
The subject of a limited nuclear war was revived by a
comment by President Reagan on 16 October 1981, in which he
stated, "I could see where you could have the exchange of
tactical weapons against troops in the field without it
bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the
button." This comment was utilized in Soviet propaganda
to frighten the West Germans into thinking that a nuclear
war could be limited to West German soil. In such a war only
the West Germans would suffer the incredible damage caused by
nuclear weapons, with their American allies escaping with no
damage at all.
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Many Soviet statements, however, do not bear out this
scenario. Rather, they indicate that the United States could
not hope to escape the consequences of a nuclear war started
in Europe. Leonid Brezhnev, for example, stated that
"...there can be in general no 'limited' nuclear war. If a
nuclear war breaks out,... it would inevitably and unavoidably
assume a worldwide character." [Ref. 18: p. 32]
Respected West German scholars have also noted that Soviet
statements are frequently contradictory on this issue. For
example, Gerhard Wettig has noted:
The threat of a nuclear war that would be restricted to
Europe and, hence, feasible for America seems to exist for
Moscow only when it addresses itself to Western Europe.
The Soviet thesis changes the moment Moscow speaks to the
people of North America. The line put forward for North
America is that there is no chance of restricting a nuclear
war between the superpowers to the European theatre.
[Ref. 17: p. 33]
Western analysts have also recognized a "damage limiting"
characteristic of the SS-20. Since it is more accurate, it
could avoid much of the collateral damage to West European
cities and industries located near military targets, thus
leaving postwar Europe more intact for the Soviets.
[Ref. 14: p. 65]
B. SOVIET STATEMENTS REGARDING THE NATO INF DECISION
In the Soviet press various writers have stressed that
the Pershing II 's and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM)
were intended for deployment long before the NATO decision
to deploy them was taken in December 1979. For example,
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Ye. Rusakov and Yu . Kharlanov have stated in Pravda that the
blueprints for the Pershing II' s and cruise missiles were on
the drawing boards by the late 1960's and early 1970 's, when
the Soviet Union had not yet deployed the SS-20 [Ref. 19:
p. AA7] . Later, "Washington decided to link its long-matured
plans for disrupting nuclear equilibrium with the Soviet
SS-20 missiles. As of 1977 this linkage began to serve as
propaganda cover." [Ref. 19: p. AA8 ] Not mentioned by the
Soviets, of course, is the fact that the SS-20' s must also
have been designed in the late 1960's in order to be usable
by the mid-1970 's.
Alluding to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's speech to the
International Institute of Strategic Studies in October 1977,
with his call to assess Soviet "grey area" weapons in an era
of strategic parity between the superpowers, Valentin Falin
noted in Izvestiya that
. . . [the] decision certainly was two-track in the sense
that its originators were two--the United States and the
FRG. Long before the Soviet SS-20 missiles appeared on
the scene, they secretly agreed to bring about the
rearmament of the bloc on the basis of the latest technology
and to persuade the allies to do this by means of purposeful
acts of misinformation. [Ref. 20: p. AA1]
Thus, the West Germans, as well as the Americans, were to
blame for the decision to deploy the Pershings and GLCM ' s
.
Prior to the NATO decision, on 6 October 1979, Brezhnev
unsuccessfully attempted to head off the Pershing II and GLCM
deployment by offering to reduce the number of medium-range
19
missile systems in the Western Soviet Union if NATO did
not make the decision to deploy.
In the opinion of the Soviets, there was parity in
medium-range nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in 1979,
although in order to arrive at equal numbers of approximately
1000 delivery vehicles for each side, they had to do so
. . .by under-counting their SS-20s (omitting reloads and
SS-20s deployed east of the Urals but capable of striking
Western Europe) , under-counting their Backfires (omitting
those assigned to naval aviation) , omitting all their
nuclear-capable fighter-bombers (Fencers, Fitters, and
Floggers), over-estimating numbers of U.S. nuclear-capable
aircraft, exaggerating the range of the Pershing I, and
counting British and French systems with U.S. totals.
[Ref. 21: p. 418]
Contradictory statements have emerged in the Soviet press
on whether or not West Germany has been targeted by Soviet
INF systems in the past. During Chancellor Kohl's visit to
Moscow in July 1983, Andropov stated that Soviet
medium-range missiles
...are not aimed against the West German Armed Forces.
But if American missiles are deployed on West German soil,
the situation will change. The military threat for West
Germany will grow manifold. Relations between our two
countries will be bound to suffer certain complications
as well. As for the Germans in the FRG and the GDR, they
would have, as someone recently put it, to look at one
another through thick palisades of missiles. [Ref. 22: p. 3]
In a more candid moment, on the other hand, Georgi Arbatov,
Director of the Institute for Study of the U.S.A. and Canada,
admitted in an interview on 23 March 1981 in Per Spiegel
that Mannheim and Frankfurt am Main "have been targets for 20
20
years by missiles you call the SS-4 and. SS-5 and nobody
got excited." [Ref. 23: p. 25]
Thus, it appears that any Soviet-imposed consequences
of a NATO deployment would not be anything new for the West
Germans and other West Europeans, although the Soviets would
like to make it appear that this is the case.
C. SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO COMMUNICATE VIEWS TO FRG THROUGH THE
MEDIA AND PROTEST MOVEMENTS
Since the inception of the NATO deployment decision, the
Soviets have exerted both indirect and direct pressure on
the West German government, its political, educational,
religious, and scientific elites, and the general public.
The Soviets have taken advantage of such media as interviews
with various West German magazines as Per Spiegel , radio
braodcasts in German, and publication of official views
in Soviet newspapers and magazines, which are translated
into German and read by the attentive public. Although not
directly sponsoring the West German anti-missile movement,
the Soviets have supported the German Communist Party (DKP)
in its organizational efforts and lent a sympathetic ear to
"peace movement" members in their media and to individuals
or groups, including members of the Greens Party and the
SPD, who have visited the Soviet Union.
Soon after the NATO deployment decision was taken, Soviet
writers began emphasizing that the Federal Republic of
Germany and other European countries accepting cruise missiles
21
would become hostages of the United States as well as targets
of the Soviet Union in a retaliatory strike. What seemed to
worry the Soviets most of all, however, was the fact that the
FRG might also "receive certain nuclear privileges from its
senior partner, and... become the USA's chief nuclear agent
in Western Europe." [Ref. 24: p. 92] Ignoring the fact that
the Federal Republic of Germany does not have unilateral
access to any nuclear weapons, the Literary Gazette charged
that "the essence of the matter is that the FRG is laying
claim to its own nuclear missile equality with the Soviet
Union, independently of the American deterrent." [Ref. 25:
p. 2] Also of concern to the Soviet Union in regard to the
FRG was the Western European Union (WEU) decision to lift
the restrictions on West German naval construction which
have been in force since 1954. Fearful of a revival of a
large West German fleet on the scale of what it possessed
during World War II, Radio Moscow saw this move as setting
a dangerous precedent for removal of restrictions on nuclear,
chemical and bacteriological weapons. [Ref. 26: pp . 4 and 5]
A year later, in June 1981, Soviet spokesman, like
Defense Minister Ustinov and Central Committee International
Information Department Head Zamyatin, were continuing to
exhibit concern for West German access to nuclear weapons and
the alleged danger of German revanchism [Ref. 27: p. 2].
And during Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in July 1983,
Andropov declared:
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It is planned to turn West German territory into a
launching site for American first strike nuclear missiles
aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies. This would
actually mean the revival of the threat of war against
the USSR being unleashed from German soil. [Ref. 22: p. 3]
Since negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United
States did not get underway until November 1981 (except for
talks with the Carter administration in late 1980), Moscow
stressed to the West Germans that the United States was not
really interested in negotiating but only in the deployment.
Of course, the actual situation was that at first the Soviets
did not want to negotiate, and after President Reagan's
election, some time was necessary for the Reagan Administration
to assess its negotiating strategy. In addition, Chancellor
Schmidt was portrayed as being completely subservient to
Washington's point of view (as has been Chancellor Kohl since
he assumed office in October 1982).
In an effort to generate more sympathy for its stand on
Euromissiles , Moscow attempted to strengthen its detente
policies with the FRG by increasing economic ties. This would
serve to "demonstrate the USSR's peaceableness and to provide
the USSR increased leverage to prevent the FRG from adopting
policies inimical to Moscow." [Ref. 28: p. 5] A key element
in this policy was the natural gas pipeline agreement signed
on 20 November 1981, which was espoused as providing
employment and fuel for Weat Germans and hard currency for
the Soviets.
23
Throughout this period, Soviet writers frequently
iterated the danger to the long-term detente efforts between
the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany if the
FRG accepted the NATO missiles on its territory.
The intention to turn West German territory into a proving
ground for US nuclear missiles that would "reach Moscow
and farther" cannot but affect the relations that were
created by the painstaking joint efforts of the USSR and
the FRG over an entire decade .... the FRG now squarely faces
the very real danger of losing the important advantages
it acquired owing to its active participation in the
processes of detente and cooperation on the European
continent. [Ref. 29: p. 12]
In an attempt to influence West German public opinion,
the Soviet press has stressed the USSR's efforts to curb the
nuclear arms race through various proposals.
Such proposals do not cost the Soviets much to make but
impact favorably on West German public opinion, as will be
noted in Chapter Ill's analysis. Examples of this are Leonid
Brezhnev's June 1982 unilateral commitment not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons and the Warsaw Pact's January
1983 proposal for a treaty with NATO on the renunciation of
force
.
Receiving particular attention in the Soviet press are
the major parties and their political elites. Even prior to
the December 1979 decision it was apparent that the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) was not united on the issue of the
deployment. In the words of A. Grigoryants:
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It is known that the Congress of the Social Democratic Party
in December 1979 consented, under strong pressure from the
party leadership, to Nachruestung [complementary armament]
under three conditions: if the new American missiles
appeared not only on West German soil; if the SALT-2 Treaty
was "immediately" ratified; and if the disarmament talks
acquired "political priority". [Ref. 30: p. 104]
Later, the SPD leadership's support for the NATO missile
decision was seen as responsible for splitting the party into
two camps and the ultimate cause of its loss of government
leadership, not to mention many of its followers. Thus,
when Hans-Jochen Vogel became the party's candidate for
Chancellor in the March 1983 elections and ran on a platform
of non-deployment of the new NATO missiles, he quickly
became Moscow's candidate of choice.
SPD proposals by such party leaders as Willy Brandt and
Egon Bahr to take British and French medium-range missiles
into consideration at the Geneva talks and to extend the
negotiations until agreement is reached have been termed
"business-like" by the Soviets.
During a visit of SPD Bundestag deputies to the Soviet
Union in Spetember 1983 in which they sought Soviet support
for demands for an immediate end to any nuclear armament,
reducing the number of SS-20's and renouncing the NATO
deployment, Andropov "[expressed] the hope that deputies of
the FRG Bundestag .. .will act with profound awareness of duty
and responsibility resting on them" to avert the implementation
of the NATO deployment [Ref. 31: p. AA3]
.
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The SPD Congress in November 1983 was termed "a congress
of atonement of sins" by Aleksandr Bovin since Helmut Schmidt
was considered to be one of the initiators of the NATO
two-track decision [Ref . 32: p. Gl] . After speeches by such
party leaders as Egon Bahr, Karsten Voigt, and Hans-Jochen
Vogel which were fearful of a new round in the arms race and
critical of the West German government for failure to promote
success at the negotiations and ignoring the will of the
majority of West Germans and the principles of the Basic Law,
the SPD Congress rejected the NATO deployment [Ref. 33: p. G3"
As one of only 14 of 397 delegates so voting at the
SPD Congress in November 1983, former Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt cast his vote for the deployment. As a catalyst for
the NATO decision and the former head of the West German
government, Schmidt supported the zero option and deployment
on schedule if no results were achieved at the negotiating
table
.
Likewise, Helmut Kohl, while in the opposition and as
Chancellor, supported the NATO decision and U.S. positions
at the negotiations, including the exclusion of British and
French medium-range missiles from consideration.
As "a party of the cold war and the arms race, revanchist
ambitions and pathological anti-Sovietism, " [Ref. 34: p. 109]
the Christian Democrats and Christian Socialists (CDU/CSU)
constantly have received unfavorable comment in the Soviet
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press. For example, in a TASS release, Chancellor Kohl
"asserted without any ground whatsoever that allegedly the
USSR 'threatens the security of its neighbors' by its
'excessive armament'" [Ref. 35: p. Gl]. Kohl is portrayed
in the Soviet press as nonresponsive to the West German
masses who oppose the deployment. Chancellor Kohl also
pointed out, to heated Soviet denials, that the Soviet Union
did not honor its delcared moratorium on deployment of SS-20
missiles [Ref. 36: p. AA6 ] . Manfred Woerner has been
accused of "attempting to get the public to reconcile
themselves to the idea that, at the appointed time and in the
appointed quantity, the missiles will, regretfully, be
deployed" [Ref. 37: p. AA5].
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister under both the
Schmidt and Kohl governments, has been criticized by TASS for
being more zealous concerning the deployment than
Washington [Ref. 38: p. G4].
The Greens have been represented in the Bundestag since
the March 1983 elections when they received over 5 per cent
of the vote. The Soviet media sees their success as
evidence of rejection of the NATO missile deployment by a
segment of the population. Former Bundeswehr General Gert
Bastian has received favorable treatment in the Soviet media
because of his view that the NATO missile deployment was
unnecessary because there was already a balance of nuclear
weapons in Europe [Ref. 39: p. 20] . The Greens were favored
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with an invitation from the Soviet Committee for European
Security and Cooperation, and a number of Greens deputies
visited the Soviet Union between 26 and 30 October 1983
[Ref . 40: pp. G2-G3] . Their request that Moscow set an
example in unilateral disarmament, however, met with protests
by Boris Ponomarev that the Soviets had repeatedly made
unilateral concessions already, including their readiness in
October 1979 to reduce their medium-range missiles if there
were no NATO decision on a deployment, their renunciation
of first use of nuclear weapons, and their unilateral
moratorium on deployment of missiles in Europe of March 1982
[Ref. 41: p. G2] . Of course, the Greens voted along with
the SPD at the Bundestag debate of 22 November to disapprove
the deployment of NATO INF missiles.
The West German parliamentary elections of 6 March 1983
were a focal point for Soviet journalists and political
figures for several months before the elections. Of the two
candidates, Hans-Jochen Vogel of the SPD was clearly favored
by the Soviets. Elements of the SPD election platform,
including reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in
Europe, conclusion of an agreement between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact on mutual renunciation of force, consideration
of British and French missiles at the Geneva talks, and
making it a goal of the Geneva negotiations to make the
missile deployment superfluous, seemed made to order for
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preserving detente with the Soviet Union, if not pursuing
Finlandization [Ref. 42: p. G12]. Still, the SPD platform
was not entirely satisfactory from the Soviet point of view.
The foreign-political formulation of the SPD election program
are indeed not fully without contradiction and not quite
consistent. They see, for example, the reasons of the
current international tensions in the actions of both
superpowers, or they expect the Soviet Union at the Geneva
negotiations with the United States to make, completely
unfounded, some sort of concessions. The inconsistency of
the SPD leadership is also demonstrated by its listlessness
or its inability to answer clearly and plainly the main
question, namely what position will the SPD take with
regard to the deployment of new American missiles in Europe
if Washington torpedoed the Geneva negotiations. [Ref. 42:
p. G13]
While the Soviets charged that the United States was
interfering in the West German elections, there was plenty
of opportunity for the Soviets to do the same during visits
of Vogel to Moscow and Gromyko to Bonn in January. During
his visit to Bonn Foreign Minister Gromyko reminded the West
Germans that their country would be caught in a nuclear
confrontation if the NATO INF missiles were installed
[Ref. 43: p. 1] and urged them to follow an independent
course in foreign affairs:
We would like the Federal Republic of Germany, in building
its relations with the Soviet Union, to express its own
personality, to be guided by its own attitudes, to be
guided by its own interests, and not to listen to external
influences if they are not in accord with those interests
and with the interests of maintaining good relations with
the Soviet Union. [Ref. 44: p. G2]
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While in Moscow, Andropov drew Vogel's attention to the
dangers that the NATO deployment would have for peace in
Europe, while Vogel gave Andropov high marks for constructive
peace initiatives [Ref. 45: p. 7].
In analysis of the CDU/CSU election victory, the Soviet
press attributed the SPD defeat to vacillations, lack of
clarity of its positions, and failure to mobilize the
potential of the antiwar movement [Ref. 46: p. Gl]
.
On a brighter note for the Soviets,
. . .the decisive and uncompromising position of the Greens
on the issue of deploying American medium-range nuclear
weapons, their categorical "no" to missiles and their
intention to continue the struggle against their deployment,
both inside parliament and outside its walls, brought
success to the party. [Ref. 47: p. G3]
The Soviet explanation for the CDU/CSU victory was its
(alleged) control of the mass media and some generous help
from industry and business [Ref. 48: p. G4], as well as their
promises to revive the economy.
Thus, the Soviet Union's attempts to influence the
election succeeded only partially. Their chancellor candidate
of choice, Hans-Jochen Vogel, was not elected, but the Greens
gained representation in the Bundestag and' would promote
policies acceptable to the Soviets (e.g., opposition to West
German membership in NATO and to a U.S. military presence in
West Germany) . Further attempts to influence the West German
public before the date set for deployment should negotiations
fail would have to be concentrated on the "peace" movement.
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Although apparently not controlled directly by Moscow,
the West German antimissile, or "peace," movement has
received organizational assistance and funding through the
West German Communist Party (DKP) , who in turn received
funding from the East German Communist Party (SED) . Soviet
writers like to emphasize that the anti-war movement has
arisen spontaneously and includes all segments of West
German society--parliamentary parties, churches and trade
unions, etc. [Ref. 29: p. 17].
The so-called parliamentary left of the SPD, which was
composed of fifty or sixty leftists in the Bundestag, made
it difficult for Chancellor Schmidt to get nuclear weapons
issues passed, as the government coalition only had a margin
of. 45 votes. In the words of Wynfred Joshua, the former
chancellor thus "became a hostage of the left wing of his
party" [Ref. 49: p. 17]. Approximately fifty SPD members
participated in the October 1981 demonstration in Bonn, and
certain elite SPD members, including Willy Brandt, have
spoken at peace demonstrations.
Soviet journalists and the press have stressed the large
numbers of West German citizens who have participated in
demonstrations, although their numbers are frequently much
higher than police estimates for the same demonstrations.
Soviet estimates of participation in major demonstrations
have included 300,000 for the October 1981 demonstrations
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and 800,000 for the 1983 Easter Week demonstrations. By
May 1983 Pravda was reporting over 4 million signatures on
the anti-missile deployment Krefeld Appeal. [Ref. 50: p. G2]
Particularly as the date set for the missile deployment
approached, the Soviet press predicted a "hot fall" with
massive demonstrations in the FRG while criticizing a
government campaign in support of the NATO decision [Ref. 51:
p. AA2] .
Actions of all kinds received coverage in the Soviet
press, from blockades of military bases to work stoppages,
human chains, and the refusal of the crew of the West German
container ship "Alemania Express" to transport Pershing II
parts from Oakland, California to the Federal Republic
[Ref. 52: p. AA9 ]
.
Sometimes the anti-missile movement has been actively
encouraged in German broadcasts from Moscow. In a recent
broadcast, Vladimir Ostrogorskiy stated that
. . .we owe all the more respect to the courage of the FRG
people who consistently advocate the cause of peace, remain
loyal to the principle of humanism, and follow the
conclusions of commonsense. [Ref. 53: p. G6]
Soviet propaganda themes aimed directly at the West
German public and the anti-missile movement include
assertions that the United States plans to limit a nuclear
war to West German soil, upset the current balance in
Eurostrategic weapons and initiate a pre-emptive strike
against the Soviet Union from West German soil, while the
32
Soviet Union is only interested in detente and proposing new
peace initiatives. Its weapons would not pose a threat to
the West Germans because they would never be used except in
retaliation against a pre-emptive strike launched by the
United States from West German soil. Furthermore, the Soviet
Union claimed to be more flexible than the United States at
the negotiating table; thus, it was the United States that
was preventing agreement at Geneva. Moreover, the United
States was not even interested in coming to an agreement
because it insisted on deploying its missiles regardless of
the outcome of the negotiations. [Ref. 54: pp. 17-57]
D. SOVIET VIEWS OF INF NEGOTIATIONS
As Yuri Andropov related in an interview with Per Spiegel
magazine, the INF negotiations, which finally got underway
in the fall of 1981, did so only at the suggestion of the
Soviets, who
. . .opened them with the resolve to achieve a reduction in
USSR and NATO medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in this
area, and a radical reciprocal lowering of the level of
nuclear confrontation. The U.S. purpose at the Geneva talks,
as it became clear, was to add new powerful weapons to the
already existing extensive NATO arsenal. The United States
would like to reduce the number of Soviet missiles only.
[Ref. 55: p. 6]
As was concluded in the Report to Ministers by NATO's
Special Consultative Group, the INF negotiations were
punctuated by Soviet claims of flexibility while actually
demonstrating inflexibility. As Yuri Andropov put it in his
replies to questions from Pravda,
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American flexibility is no more than verbal... We have
displayed and are displaying flexibility in finding specific
solutions, given the observance of a single but immutable
demand: The balance of forces in Europe in terms of
medium-range nuclear armaments must not be violated. .. .This
means, first, that the new American missiles must not be
deployed in Europe .... Second, all the nuclear means of the
relevant range on both sides must be taken into consideration-
with no exceptions. [Ref. 56: p. AA1]
With all of the foregoing stipulations, however, somehow
Soviet "flexibility" is difficult to locate. The bottom line
for the Soviets was no NATO deployment of Pershing II 's and
cruise missiles whatsoever while maintaining a force of at
least some SS-20's. This, of course, would leave NATO where
it was before the dual track decision was taken in 1979 with
no equivalent means of retaliation against the SS-20's.
During the first round of negotiations, which formally
commenced in Geneva on 30 November 1981, the United States
presented its zero option, which provided for the cancellation
of the Pershing II and GLCM deployment if the Soviet Union
dismantled all of its SS-4's, SS-5's and SS-20's. The Soviet
counter to this was a proposal to limit both Soviet and NATO
medium-range missiles and delivery aircraft in Europe to 300
each. Of course, since the Soviets would count British and
French systems into this total (they counted 263), this would
leave the United States with only 37 aircraft in Europe,
which would mean that the U.S. would essentially have to
eliminate its dual-capable aircraft in or near Europe.
Meanwhile, the Soviets would retain 300 triple-warhead SS-20
missiles. Other proposals made during the opening round,
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which would be referred to again and again in propaganda
directed toward Western Europe, were a proposal to limit the
number of Soviet medium-range forces to equal those of
Britain and France and another proposal for the elimination
of all medium and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe,
thus leaving Soviet strategic forces as the only nuclear
forces in Europe. [Ref. 57: pp. 9-13]
The Soviet response to the zero option was that it would
unilaterally disarm the Soviet Union.
During the second round of negotiations, which lasted
from 20 May until 20 July 1982, the Soviets tabled a draft
treaty on reducing NATO and Soviet medium-range systems to
300 each while the U.S. tried to clarify ambiguous issues,
including inclusion of British and French forces and aircraft
and geographic scope. It was during this round that the
famous "walk in the woods" discussion between the American
and Soviet Ambassadors, Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky,
occurred. An agreement on the basis of this discussion
would have provided for 75 cruise missiles for the U.S., 75
ballistic missiles for the Soviets, a limit of 90 LRINF
missile launchers for the Soviets in the eastern USSR, and no
inclusion of aircraft or British/French missiles in the
formula. However, when Kvitsinsky returned for the beginning
of the third round after having discussed the issue with the
Soviet leadership, he informed Nitze that the Soviet Union
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insisted on full compensation for British and French
medium-range forces, reductions in aircraft and no U.S.
deployments at all. [Ref. 57: pp. 15-19]
Throughout the third round, which lasted from 30
September until 30 November 1982 the Soviets proposed minor
variations on their old position but still insisted that they
be allowed to retain medium-range forces equivalent to those
of Britain and France while the United States must not only
not be allowed an equivalent force but also virtually
eliminate its dual-capable aircraft from Europe.
It increasingly became apparent that the Soviet effort in
Geneva was aimed to a significant extent, if not primarily,
at public opinion. The Soviets tabled several variations
of the same proposal--all of which would have had the same
essential outcomes—apparently to position themselves to
claim that they had shown "flexibility" and had offered a
range of solutions to the INF problem. At the same time,
they increasingly stymied progress, even on the smallest
of issues, in an effort to create the appearance of a
negotiating deadlock, the blame for which they attempted
to place on the U.S. [Ref. 57: p. 22]
During 1982 the Soviets reminded the West Germans about
all the actions they were taking to halt the arms race. In
March Brezhnev declared a unilateral end to further deployment
of SS-20's in the eastern Soviet Union. On 15 June Brezhnev
pledged no first use of nuclear weapons at a meeting of the
United Nations. An excerpt from Pravda gives evidence that
the Soviets did, indeed, intend to influence the West Germans
by their actions:
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Soviet peace initiatives show West Germans that, despite
all the slander against the USSR, it in fact seeks to halt
the arms race and the growth of the danger of war in Europe.
A truly tremendous response was elicited in the FRG by the
important initiative which the USSR put forward in
mid-June by unilaterally making a solemn promise not to
be the first to use nuclear weapons. [Ref. 58: p. AA6
]
During the fourth round of negotiations, which lasted from
26 January until 29 March 1983, the Soviets attempted to make
the British and French missiles the cornerstone of their
position by tabling a draft treaty tying the level of Soviet
missiles in Europe to the level of British and French missiles,
which was 162 by their count. At the close of the round, the
United States introduced its interim option, which proposed
equal levels of warheads on U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range
missiles on a global basis. Thus, some Pershing II ' s and
GLCM's would be deployed but not as many as originally
planned. [Ref. 57: pp. 23-26]
However, the Soviets were not impressed by the interim
option. Andropov complained to Per Spiegel that both the
zero and interim options would have the effect of disarming
the Soviet Union. In his words,
Try to consider the situation from the viewpoint of the
Soviet Union and its legitimate interests: on what grounds
and by what right do they want to leave us unarmed in the
face of these British and French nuclear missiles aimed at
our country? .. .The Soviet Union has the same right to
security as the peoples of America, Britain, France, and
other countries. [Ref. 55: pp. 7-8]
In other words, the Soviet idea of security appears to be
having the same number of missiles as all NATO countries and
China collectively.
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During the fifth round of negotiations, which lasted from
17 May until 14 July 1983, the United States tabled a draft
treaty embodying the interim option. At this time the Soviets
proposed equal ceilings on warheads on INF missiles and
aircraft. Since they estimated over 400 warheads currently
on British and French missiles, this would result in a small
reduction in SS-20's below the level of 162, but they reserved
the right to increase their numbers of warheads if the British
and French increased theirs. [Ref. 57: pp. 26-29]
In late August General Secretary Andropov proposed in
Pravda that the Soviet Union would "liquidate" any excess
missiles if a reduction were agreed to at the Geneva talks.
At the sixth round, between 6 September and 23 November 1983,
however, the Soviets maintained a hard line, still insisting
that there be no U.S. deployments and that British and French
INF forces must be taken into account. [Ref. 57: pp. 30-31]
In a last minute attempt to influence public opinion
before the scheduled deployment, Yuri Andropov announced in
an interview with Pravda that the Soviet Union would be
willing to reduce to 140 missile launchers in Europe, halt
deployment of SS-20's in the eastern USSR, and establish
equal levels of medium-range aircraft [Ref. 56: p. AA2 ]
.
The final U.S. proposal was for a global ceiling of 420
LRINF warheads, but this was rejected by the Soviets on
17 November [Ref. 57: p. 34].
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In a final attempt to influence public opinion before
the Bundestag debate in the Federal Republic on 21 and 22
November, Kvitsinskiy on 13 November revealed privately to
Ambassador Nitze that the Soviets would be prepared to
accept a U.S. proposal to reduce warheads by 572 on each
side. This would leave the Soviets with 120 SS-20's, while
the U.S. would not be able to deploy any of its Pershing II'
s
or GLCM's. Although the British and French forces would not
be mentioned, the Soviets would pursue compensation for them
in a future forum. While Ambassador Nitze presented this
proposal to Washington, the Soviets delivered notes to several
NATO governments describing it as a U.S. proposal and stating
that it retained the link to British and French proposals.
In any event the offer was unacceptable to the U.S. and was
rejected on 19 November. [Ref. 57: pp. 35-36]
Finally, oh 23 November, the Soviets suspended negotiations
indefinitely after the West German Bundestag voted in favor of
deployment since the negotiations had not been successful
during the time agreed to be allotted to them.
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III. THE IMPACT IN WEST GERMANY OF SOVIET
INF-RELATED ACTIVITIES
A. INFLUENCE ON THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT
While Soviet influence seems to have made some inroads
among West German public opinion and certain political
parties, notably the Social Democrats and the Greens, the
West German government, at first under the Social Democrat
(SPD)/Free Democrat (FDP) coalition and after 1 October 1982
under the Christian Democrat/Christian Socialist (CDU/CSU)
/
Free Democrat coalition, has stood firmly behind the NATO
decision of 12 December 1979.
For the government the NATO decision linking intermediate-
range nuclear force modernization and arms control negotiations
complemented the West German security policy of defense and
detente. As Chancellor Schmidt noted in his previously
mentioned speech to the International Institute of Strategic
Studies in October 1977, with the equalization of the U.S.-
Soviet strategic balance in SALT II, the European military
balance was left unsecured. Now that the United States was
no longer ahead in the intercontinental field, it would
jeopardize West European security if Soviet superiority in
intermediate-range weapons (e.g., the SS-20 and the Backfire
bomber) continued to increase without a NATO response.
After a year and a half of NATO discussion on the INF
problem, at a summit meeting at Guadeloupe in January 1979,
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Chancellor Schmidt committed the Federal Republic of Germany
to accepting the stationing of LRINF missiles, provided the
FRG was not the only European country in which the missiles
were deployed, and pressed for a parallel effort to negotiate
arms limitations, in order to both satisfy domestic critics
and maintain West German-Soviet detente [Ref . 59: pp. 203-204]
.
As was explicit in his 1977 speech and NATO's 1979 decision,
another motive for holding arms control talks was the hope that
they might succeed in eliminating the need to deploy counter-
vailing NATO weapons systems. Seeking to minimize diplomatic
damage with the Soviet Union, the West Germans also decided
against the traditional "two-key" arrangement currently in use
with the Pershing IA short-range missiles. Thus, the Pershing
II 's and GLCM's would remain under American control
exclusively. [Ref. 60: p. 88]
As members of the NATO High Level Group (HLG) , which by late
spring 1979 had decided to support deployment of 200-600
Pershing II and GLCM missiles, the West Germans insisted on a
force small enough not to be too provocative to the Soviets
or to produce a "decoupling" effect, which might obviate the
need for the U.S. strategic deterrent [Ref. 59: p. 205].
In a recent article for NATO Review , Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher emphasized that the West German
government and the Bundestag had been involved from the outset
on the steps leading to the formulation of the NATO decision.
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Throughout 1979 deliberations were conducted at the Federal
Security Council, Federal Cabinet, and Bundestag levels, and
the Federal Cabinet approved the draft two-track decision on
10 October 1979. Emphasizing the cooperative spirit of the
Western negotiating position, Genscher reiterated that there
were no "American" negotiating positions at the Geneva talks
but that "each aspect of the Western negotiating position has,
ever since 1979, been jointly elaborated in the Special
Consultative Group (SCG) set up as a result of a German
initiative." [Ref. 61: pp. 4-6]
Chancellor Schmidt also announced in a speech to the SPD
Bundestag faction on 13 November 1979 that the NATO proposal
to withdraw 1000 nuclear warheads from Europe was a German
initiative [Ref. 7: p. 57].
After the NATO decision of 12 December 1979, the Soviets
declared that they would not negotiate at all unless NATO
rescinded its decision. Committed politically to pursuing
the earliest possible start of negotiations, Chancellor
Schmidt met with General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow in
July 1980 and managed to get the Soviets to agree to hold
preliminary talks with the Americans. However, the price,
consisting of including NATO forward-based systems (FBS)
in the scope of the talks, was steep. As Hans Ruehle
postulated, the "Chancellor wanted negotiations at almost
any price--and he got the negotiations." [Ref. 62: p. 56]
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A 26 May 1981 resolution of the German Bundestag, adopted
with only five votes against and six abstentions, further
supported the NATO decision, stating,
The German Bundestag supports the Federal Government in the
consistent, scheduled implementation of both parts of the
NATO decision of 12 December 1979. In this context, it
stresses that the West will review NATO's INF requirements
in the light of concrete negotiated results. [Ref. 61: p. 5]
Again, in a security policy statement of 31 March 1982,
the Federal Government stated that "...concrete negotiated
results can only be attained if the Soviet Union knows that,
in the event of failure of the negotiations, the deployment
of American systems will begin in late 1983." [Ref. 61: p. 7]
With the accession of Chancellor Kohl's CDU/CSU/FDP
government on 1 October 1982, the official position of the FRG
in relation to the NATO deployment did not change. In his
policy statement of 13 October 1982, Chancellor Kohl affirmed:
The Federal Government is wholly committed to the NATO
dual-track decision of 1979 which proposes negotiations on
the reduction and limitation of Soviet and American
intermediate-range nuclear systems ... .The Federal
Government adheres to the Western objective of negotiating
a mutual zero solution, in other words, the complete
renunciation of land-based Soviet and American
intermediate-range systems. [Ref. 63: p. 35]
In its White Paper published in October 1983, the Federal
Government dealt with aspects of Soviet propaganda aimed at
the Federal Republic of Germany and other European governments
to dissuade them from complying with the NATO dual-track
decision. The White Paper pointed out inconsistencies in
Soviet propaganda. For example,
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...the Soviets combine the claim they were not threatening
Western Europe with the warning that any stationing of new
U.S. nuclear weapons would increase the number of targets
for the Soviet nuclear weapons and thus be an additional
hazard to the countries where U.S. missiles are to be
deployed. [Ref. 9: p. 18]
The Federal Government in its White Paper also recognized
the SS-20 build-up as more than a modernization because of
the SS-20 *s superiority to the SS-4's and SS-5's in terms of
mobility, accuracy, response capability, and survivability as
well as the substantial increase in the number of warheads
capable of being delivered. Also cited was the fallacy of
the use of the Pershing II as a first strike weapon due to
its limited range and number. [Ref. 9: pp. 74-77]
Further, the White Paper noted that after Brezhnev's
declared moratorium on 16 March 1982 on the deployment of
LRINF missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union,
the Soviets continued to complete SS-20 sites under
construction in that part of the Soviet Union [Ref. 9: p. 196;
An evaluation of the various Soviet negotiating positions
resulted in the conclusion that
...the Soviet position remains unchanged in its essentials:
the Soviets are intent on negotiating a treaty which rules
out the presence of any United States INF missiles in
Europe and thus perpetuates their own monopoly in this
category of weapon. [Ref. 9: p. 201]
Soviet superiority in Europe was effectively conceded in
Andropov's 27 August 1983 offer to reduce the number of
Soviet INF missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union
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to the number of British and French systems, i.e., 162
missiles, and to scrap all other Soviet INF systems stationed
in Europe if the United States waived its deployment [Ref. 9:
p. 202]
.
Soviet negotiating tactics have involved an attempt to
appear conciliatory while refusing to accord the nations of
Western Europe the same measure of security as the Soviet
Union claims for herself.
Along with her negotiating tactics of relinquishing
untenable positions only step by step and labelling this
approach in public as an indication of flexibility, the
Soviet Union has again and again resorted to threats
.
The catalogue of sanctions threatened in the event of
United States INF missiles being deployed in Europe ranges
from political reactions— such as discontinuance of
negotiations or deterioration of West-East relations--to
the cancellation of the unilateral SS-20 moratorium, the
deployment of shorter-range INF systems in East European
countries, or sanctions against the United States.
[Ref. 9: p. 204]
On the subject of the British and French missiles, the
White Paper pointed out that when Chancellor Schmidt and
Foreign Minister Genscher visited Moscow in the summer of
1980, the Soviet Union was prepared to delay consideration
of the British and French systems in nuclear arms control
negotiations with the U.S., on the model of SALT I and II.
Since the inclusion of the British and French missiles was
obviously added later to complicate the negotiations and
because the nations of Western Europe should have the same
right to security as the Soviet Union claims for herself,
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Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher urged the
Soviets to drop this demand during their July 1983 visit to
Moscow. [Ref. 9: pp. 208 and 210]
Finally, after the Bundestag debate on 21 November 1983, on
the strength of a CDU/CSU/FDP majority, the West German
Bundestag reaffirmed its 26 May 1981 resolution to support the
Federal Government in the implementation of both parts of the
NATO decision of 12 December 1979. By the end of 1983, the
first battery of nine Pershing II missiles was installed in
West Germany.
Thus, Soviet efforts to deter the Federal Government
from supporting and implementing the NATO dual track decision
were unsuccessful.
B. IMPACT ON WEST GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES
The NATO INF modernization has become a heated issue in
West German party politics. While the SPD was the party in
power at the time the NATO decision was taken, it eventually
was to become almost universally opposed to the implementation
of the decision, a situation which was evident at the party
congress on 19 November 1983.
The explanation for this seeming about-face lies in the
assumption of most SPD members that the arms control aspect
of the decision would be emphasized at the expense of the
modernization aspect. Members of the SPD Left, led by
Herbert Wehner, thought that Soviet military power should be
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regarded as defensive rather than aggressive and that arms
control negotiations must be pursued before any deployments
might take place; indeed, negotiations would almost certainly
obviate the planned NATO modernization. This position was
accepted not only by the SPD Left but by the party as a
whole. [Ref. 64: pp. 538-539]
Besides assuming that arms control negotiations would
have greater emphasis (to the point of being successful), SPD
members at the December 1979 party congress linked the
approval of the NATO decision with ratification of the SALT II
Treaty. As Hans Ruehle phrased it, "it was the consensus of
the discussants that negotiations over TNF could be conducted
successfully only in an arms control climate that had been
positively influenced by the ratification of the SALT II
Treaty." [Ref. 62: p. 56]
After the October 1980 election, the SPD Left became
stronger when twenty-four younger, left-oriented SPD members
replaced older SPD deputies, and a hard core of 50-70 SPD
members formed in opposition to the NATO decision. Other
factors making the SPD Left more attractive included the
deterioration in East-West detente generated by the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the nonratif ication of SALT II,
which appeared to endanger West German-Soviet detente and
SPD declarations of support for peace rallies and various
appeals for the reversal of government support for the NATO
decision, e.g., the Krefeld and Bielefeld appeals. [Ref. 64:
pp. 544-545]
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By early 1982, it looked as if a vote at the April 1982
SPD congress might reject the NATO decision. Therefore, the
executive committee decided that the vote to evaluate the
results of the Geneva negotiations should be postponed until
the fall of 1983. The resolution on security policy adopted
by the SPD at its April congress confirmed that there must
be no stationing automatism, i.e., no missiles must be
stationed in the FRG until the SPD assessed the results of
the negotiations. The SPD also endorsed the Soviet position
of including the French and British systems in the East-West
balance at this congress. [Ref. 65: p. 6]
Once the SPD passed into the opposition after losing in a
vote of no confidence to a CDU/CSU/FDP coalition headed by
Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 1 October 1982, the SPD was free
of the restraints of office and could pursue a more
ideologically pure course. Instead of concentrating on the
economic issues that brought down the SPD/FDP government,
Hans-Jochen Vogel, in his bid for the chancellorship in the
6 March 1983 elections, concentrated on foreign policy issues,
specifically the INF deployment. By this time the party was
split into three groups: a right wing under Schmidt, a
left wing under Vogel and Brandt, and a group of defectors
to the Greens. Due to his support for the inclusion of French
and British nuclear systems and for U.S. abandonment of its
"zero option" in the Geneva negotiations, Vogel was given
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very favorable treatment in the Soviet capital and in the
Soviet press during his visit to the Soviet Union in
January 1983. He was the candidate of choice for the Soviets.
After its defeat in the March 1983 election, the SPD went
even further in the direction of opposition to nuclear weapons
on West German territory. In a report submitted to the SPD
Executive Committee by a Working Group on "New Strategies,"
SPD members suggested that nuclear weapons should not be
stationed on the territory of states which do not possess
such weapons (with the ultimate aim of a nuclear-free Europe)
and that non-nuclear states should have the right to
co-determination in the nuclear strategic planning policy of
the states which do possess nuclear weapons. [Ref. 66:
pp. 27-28]
By the time of the SPD special congress in Cologne on
19 November 1983, a negative 'vote on the deployment was a
foregone conclusion, and (as noted earlier) the vast majority
of delegates (383 out of 397) voted against the deployment.
Schmidt staunchly remained a member of the overwhelmed
minority at the party congress and voted against a resolution
to oppose the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles
in West Germany.
In a speech to the Bundestag during its debate on
21 November 1983, Helmut Schmidt stressed the importance of
the Federal Republic keeping its word in regard to the
missile deployment as important for alliance solidarity and
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preserving the political balance in Europe vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. He also stressed the most recent progress of
the negotiations with the U.S. willing to concede the Soviet
Union 140 SS-20's, while the Soviet Union still demanded
that the United States deploy no missiles at all. Ironically,
those who supported Schmidt's viewpoint were no longer members
of his own party but members of his former opposition, the
CDU and CSU.
Since the party congress and Bundestag debate, the SPD,
under the leadership of Willy Brandt, has been striving to
coopt the protest and "peace" movement by assimilating its
themes [Ref. 67: p. 30],
The Christian Democrats and Christian Socialists have
supported the NATO dual-track decision from the beginning,
even while in the opposition. However, such foreign
policy experts as Manfred Woerner and Alois Mertes emphasized
more strongly the necessity of modernizing as a response to
the Eastern buildup. [Ref. 7: p. 56] Soviet attacks on the
CDU/CSU since they came to power in October 1982 have not
affected the CDU/CSU number of party supporters to any great
extent.
The Free Democratic Party (FDP) , led by Hans-Dietrich
Genscher under both governing coalitions, has placed an equal
priority on arms control and modernization, although at a
party conference in May 1981, as many as 47% of the voting
delegates refused to endorse the NATO decision [Ref. 68: p. 49]
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Like the SPD, the FDP has had trouble with the allegiance of
its younger members. The Young Democrats, or JUDO ' s , some
of whom draw a parallel between U.S. missiles in the Federal
Republic and Soviet missiles in Cuba, officially split from
the party on 27 November 1982 [Ref. 69: p. J3], many joining
the new social-liberal party established on 28 November,
because they could not obtain agreement for their ideas in
regard to renunciation of plans to site Pershing II 's and
GLCM's in the Federal Republic at the party congress earlier
in the month [Ref. 70: p. J2]. The FDP ' s switch of allegiance
in October 1982 from the SPD to the CDU/CSU over economic
issues also alienated some of its more moderate members.
In June 1984, for the first time, the FDP failed to gain
enough votes to be represented in the European Parliament.
Whether this means that the FDP will also fail to obtain the
minimum 5% of the vote in future West German elections is
unclear.
The Greens, including such spokesmen as Petra Kelly,
Otto Schily and Marie Beck-Oberdorf , have grown in size by
absorbing disgruntled members of the SPD and FDP, claiming
to be "the anti-party party." [Ref. 71: p. 27] For the
first time the Greens gained entrance to the Bundestag in
the March 1983 elections by obtaining over 5% of the vote.




.opposed to the INF modernization on the grounds that the
new deployments would increase rather than decrease tensions;
that they would make limited war more rather than less likely;
and that they would only fuel the arms race. [Ref. 72: p. 110]
The Greens have been active in anti-missile demonstrations,
although they have had their differences with the West German
Communist Party (DKP) , which they accuse of attempting to
exercise too much control over the anti-nuclear movement and
which declines to condemn both Soviet and American missiles
[Ref. 73: p. 15] . At first, it appeared that various
factions, such as the "fundamentalists," who are concerned
about preserving the party's protest roots, and the "pragma-
tists," who are more concerned about having an impact on
national policy, might split the party [Ref. 74: p. 29]
.
However, the Greens have since toned down some of their
theatrics to the extent that their popularity has grown to
over 8%, and they have gained representation in the recent
European Parliament elections.
The West German Communist Party, the DKP, while not a
major political party represented in the Bundestag, never-
theless figures prominently in the anti-missile movement.
Receiving some funding through the East German Communist
Party, the SED , the DKP is an organizing factor behind many
of the anti-missile demonstrations, partly because it has
the funding available to transport participants to
demonstration sites and pay other necessary expenses.
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C. IMPACT ON PROTEST MOVEMENTS
Manfred Woerner defines the genesis of the West German
"peace movement" in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and
the SPD ' s subsequent 1980 election theme as the only party
capable of maintaining peace. This brought security issues
to the center of public debate, and the. 1979 NATO deployment
decision became the principal vehicle for this debate.
[Ref. 75: p. 16]
In the Federal Republic of Germany protest movements have
been instrumental in bringing negative interpretations of the
NATO Pershing II and GLCM deployment before the population.
Assisting the "peace movement" in this regard, the Soviets
employed a wide variety of covert and overt activities in
the hope of cancelling the modernization in the event the
results of the negotiations were not satisfactory to them.
These activities, or "active measures," were based on
deception and
...include the use of agents of influence, local communist
parties and local and international communist front
organizations; the spreading of disinformation, false
letters and forgeries; the manipulation of media, and the
funding of anti-INF and anti-NATO efforts. [Ref. 49: p. 10]
Joshua saw the anti-INF campaign as being orchestrated
by the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's International
Department. Other Soviet agencies active in the propaganda
effort included the International Information Department, the
KGB, and members of the such research institutes as the
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Institute of the USA and Canada. Soviet spokesmen who are
leaders of these organizations, e.g., Boris Ponomarev,
Vadim Zagladin, Leonid Zamyatin, and Georgiy Arbatov,
frequently iterated the Soviet propaganda line in statements
to the press. [Ref. 49: pp. 10-11]
The Soviets knew better- than to get directly involved in
the anti-missile movement and exerted their influence through
such front organizations as the Committee for Peace,
Disarmament and Cooperation (KFAZ), which was instrumental
in preparing for the first major European demonstration held
in Bonn on 10 October 1981 [Ref. 76: p. 50]. Another front
organization, the German Peace Union, organized the Krefeld
Forum of church groups, front organizations, pacifists and
Green Party members in November 1980, eventually claiming
some five million signatures against the INF deployment
[Ref. 49: p. 15]
.
The organizational core of the "peace movement" in the
Federal Republic was the DKP , which received DM fifty million
annually from the East German Communist Party (SED) . However,
the DKP ' s insistence on absolute organizational control began
to antagonize the Greens, who accused the DKP of dominating
and manipulating an organizational meeting of peace activists
in Bad Godesberg on 4 April 1982. [Ref. 76: p. 54]
Besides the Greens and the churches, the SPD left has
been active in various peace demonstrations with 58 SPD
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Bundestag deputies signing a declaration supporting the
October 1981 Bonn demonstration [Ref. 49: p. 17]. Also,
SPD elite members, such as Erhard Eppler and Willy Brandt,
have spoken at peace demonstrations
.
Other major groups participating in the "peace movement"
included the ASF (Aktion Suehnezeichen Friedensdienste)
,
DFG (Deutsche Friedens Gesellschaf t ) , BBU (Bundesverband
Buergerinitiativen Umweltschutz) , Pax Christi, Women for Peace,
and the youth wings of the SPD and FDP (JUSO's and JUDO's)
[Ref. 77: p. 29]
.
These groups are committed to nonviolent direct action,
which means that the action does not take place within
existing governmental structures and laws but comes directly
from the people. Additionally, no direct violence is used
against people, although acts of violence against objects
are permissible. [Ref. 78: p. 15]
Manfred Woerner has defined the "peace movement" as a
heterogeneous group with five basic categories of pacifist
currents. These include: 1) the "pacifism of faith," which
attracts representatives of organized religions, 2) the
"pacifism of fear," which attracts those afraid of war and
the future, 3) the "pacifism of welfare," which attracts
those interested in protecting their own economic well-being
at the expense of defense outlays, 4) the "pacifism of
expedience," whose adherents take their orders directly
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from the Soviet Union, and 5) a "reunification (or
nationalist-neutralist) pacifism." [Ref. 75: p, 17]
Besides the pacifist currents, Wilfried von Bredow
recognized three additional intellectual and political streams
which contributed to the "peace movement." These included
the ecologists, the, undogmatic socialists, and the Communists.
[Ref. 79: pp. 42-43]
The young make up a very large component of the "peace
movement." Stephen Szabo demonstrated a larger degree of
support for the "peace movement" from those born since World
War II, who grew up in a period of great affluence and who
are now facing economic insecurity due to a job market which
offers fewer jobs [Ref. 80: pp. 46 and 49] . This generation
expects the "continuation of prosperity and the detente of
the 1970s as the normal state of international affairs" and
"sees any addition to Western .. .nuclear capabilities as
unnecessary and probably immoral as well." [Ref. 81: pp. 93
and 94] Pierre Hassner put it best when he wrote:
To be told that the party is over and that one should return
to the priority of the Soviet threat and of military budgets
just at a time when economic scarcity and austerity also
attack the new priorities based on affluence produces a
feeling of disbelief and revolt. This is the well-known
"Tocqueville effect' according to which the reversal of a
favorable trend is much less easily accepted than the
situation which this trend had begun to change. It is
combined with the generational problem since the generation
of detente would admit defeat if it accepted to return to
the values and priorities of their parents, based on an
experience which is essentially alien to them. [Ref. 82:
pp. 14-15]
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Among young university students, Gerhard Wettig has
defined an "alternative lifestyle personality type," those
who have come primarily from the middle class and have
managed to grow up without having any firm values imparted
to them. Emotionally self-centered and morally arrogant
towards policy makers (in that they consider themselves the
sole repositories of virtue and good faith) , these young
people feel they no longer have anything in common with West
Germany's politicians and the system they represent. Thus,
they have become hard-core pacifists and environmentalists.
[Ref. 83: pp. 225-228]
The activities of the anti-missile movement centered
primarily around demonstrations, human chains, hunger strikes,
and blockages of military installations at key times, such as
during Easter Week and on the anniversary of the NATO
deployment decision. Organizers typically overestimate the
numbers of participants. For example, during the 1982 Easter
Week demonstrations, organizers estimated participation of
140,000 people throughout the Federal Republic on 10 April;
police estimates were around half this figure [Ref. 84: p. Jl]
The "peace movement" has been more noted for what it is
against rather than what it is for and has generally confined
itself to criticizing NATO and nuclear weapons. "Peace
movement" participants have been particularly sensitive to
arguments that the superpowers may try to limit a nuclear war
to West German soil, that there are already too many nuclear
57
weapons on West German soil, that any new installations of
nuclear weapons would provide additional targets for the
Soviets, and that the United States should set the example
for halting the arms race by nondeployment of the Pershing
II' s and GLCM's. Some "peace movement" participants
(although not a majority) advocate a neutralist policy by
dropping out of NATO; others favor SPD disarmament expert
Egon Bahr's proposal to make the Federal Republic a
nuclear-free zone [Ref . 85: pp. 105 and 108]
.
During the course of the Soviet INF campaign, it became
extremely useful for the Soviet Union to utilize these fears
of nuclear devastation, hoping that the "peace movement"
would grow to such an extent that overwhelming public
opposition might curtail the missile deployment.
D. OPINION POLLS
If the Soviets can be said to have had any success,
given the failure of the negotiations and the beginning
of the NATO INF deployment, it must be in the area of
transformation of West German public opinion. Various
opinion polls have demonstrated that there has been a
notable shift in West German public opinion from pro- to
anti-INF deployment, both at the general public and elite
levels, since the inception of the NATO INF deployment
decision.
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Bruce Russett and Donald R. Deluca suggest that the key
factors in this non-support of the INF deployment by the
general public in Europe were "a new loss of confidence in
the current political leadership of the United States combined
with a longstanding popular reluctance to rely as confidently
as do their governments on nuclear deterrence." [Ref. 86:
p. 179] Remarks by President Reagan and Secretary of State
Alexander Haig in the fall of 1981 about limiting a nuclear
war to Europe clearly upset the West Germans and tended to
undermine their confidence in the basic prudence and
reliability of the United States.
Peter Schmidt credits the Soviet Union with success in
improving its image in the Federal Republic over the past
four years. According to Gallup, the percentage of West
Germans who believe in the commitment of the Soviet Union
to seek a reconciliation with the West increased from 16%
in January 1980 to 45% in January 1983. [Ref. 87: p. 37]
To the extent that both the Soviet Union and the United
States are accused of not doing enough to bring the INF
negotiations to a successful conclusion (70% of those queried
by STERN magazine in October 1983 were of this opinion) , the
Soviet Union has succeeded in presenting itself to the West
German public as an entity no more unreasonable than the
Federal Republic's ally, the United States [Ref. 88: p. 76].
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Even among West German security policy elites, who would
usually be expected to exhibit the most pro-INF deployment
responses, the Science Center Berlin Mail Survey of August
1983 revealed that with the deployment of Pershing II' s and
GLCM's, the majority (53%) of these elites felt that security
and stability in Europe would decrease. Again a majority
(54%) felt that the deployment would lower the nuclear
threshold in Europe, and the danger of war would increase.
This line of reasoning appears to follow from the security
elites' majority view (57%) that there is a rough balance
between the military strength of the East and the West;
thus, an increase in Western INF forces would create an
imbalance. [Ref. 89: p. 7]
Yet, a majority (75%) of these security elites felt that
the implementation of the 1979 NATO INF decision was
moderately to very important for alliance cohesion [Ref. 89;
p. 12] .
The STERN opinion poll covered several aspects of the NATO
modernization during two time periods--November 1982 and
September/October 1983 and separated its results by sex, age,
and political party. STERN noted that the majority of West
Germans feared the consequences of the deployment, to
include greater danger of war, new East-West tensions,
worsening of the relationship with the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) , and increasing dependence on the United States.
[Ref. 88: p. 70]
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During both time periods about one-third of those queried
indicated that they were supporters of the "peace movement."
However, only 3-4% considered themselves to be active
supporters, the rest being more in the category of sympathizers
The typical "peace movement" supporter was slightly more
likely to be female than male (37 versus 33%), young (46% less
than 30 years old), and a member of the Green Party. However,
70% of those queried did not believe that the "peace movement"
could prevent the stationing of the new missiles, and 76% were
against protestors utilizing force. [Ref. 88: pp. 70-71]
In June 1982, a clear majority (69%) felt that the
Federal Republic needed the alliance and that it would be too
weak by itself to ensure its own security as a neutral state.
By September 1983, this majority had declined to 58%, half
the difference being taken up by people who had since become
undecided. [Ref. 88: p. 71]
Between two polls conducted in August and September/October
1983, opposition grew from 40% to 46% (including 87% of the
Greens and 65% of the SPD members) against the NATO deployment
in the event the Geneva negotiations failed and the Soviet
Union left its SS-20's directed against Europe in place.
Nevertheless, 68% of those polled believed that in the event
of a breakdown of negotiations, the NATO missiles would be
installed, and even after all this 63% believed negotiations
would eventually be renewed. [Ref. 88: p. 72]
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An interesting aspect of the poll was the degree of
participation people might take in the anti-missile movement.
One out of every two persons polled stated that they might
take part in a discussion or attend a church service.
Approximately one out of three persons would take part in a
peaceful demonstration. One out of four would wear a button
or have a bumper sticker on his/her car. One out of five
might actually contribute money to the "peace movement."
Only 7% would actually participate in a blockade of a military
installation. Fully a quarter of those polled, however,
would not participate in the "peace movement" in any way,
especially if they were CDU/CSU supporters or over 45 years
of age. [Ref. 88: p. 75]
Other significant opinion polls include one conducted
by SINUS (Social-Scientific Institute Nowack and Soergel in
Munich) , which was ordered by the Schmidt government and
completed under Chancellor Kohl in January 1983. In this
poll, 61% favored a postponement of the NATO deployment
while only 22% advocated deployment in the event no agreement
was reached at the negotiations. Even among CDU/CSU voters
54% advocated postponement while only 32% supported a fall
deployment. 65% of SPD voters were in favor of postponement
while only 17% were for deployment. In this poll 49% of FRG
citizens were of the opinion that more American missiles
would intensify the risk of a nuclear war; only 24% thought
that counterarmament would ensure peace. [Ref. 90: pp. J4-5]
62
A public opinion poll conducted by the ZDF television
network showed 75% of all FRG citizens to be against the
deployment of new missiles in the event an agreement was not
reached. Only 20% of the interviewees recommended the
official government policy. [Ref. 91: p. J2]
Reportage of polls like those mentioned have dominated.
the West German media, although there have been other polls,
such as a Gallup poll in January 1983 [Ref. 90: p. J5]
,
which showed that the majority of FRG citizens advocated the
deployment. Of course, the polls which were noted in the
Soviet press were always the ones showing that a large
percentage of West Germans opposed the NATO missile deployment
Whether the Soviet propaganda campaign can claim all of
the credit for the change in West German public opinion is
questionable, but it appears that their reassurances of
peaceful intent and the smokescreen of minor alterations in
their negotiating position while retaining their basic
position, i.e., no NATO deployment, had some of the desired
effects on public opinion even though these were not




The 22 November 1983 Bundestag vote in favor of
beginning the NATO deployment was a severe setback for the
Soviet Union's propaganda efforts to avert the missile
deployment. The next day the Soviets walked out of the Geneva
negotiations, and the day after that a statement was issued
in Andropov's name stating that countermeasures would be
forthcoming. This seems to indicate that the Soviets' eyes
were on the Federal Republic of Germany, and the German
response triggered the Soviet response. After all, although
the Soviet Union, in its propaganda efforts, made much of the
cruise missiles, it must have really been the Pershing II,
with its short flight time, which was more feared, and West
Germany was the only European country slated to accept the
Pershing II. If the Pershing II was now going to be deployed,
there was no need to continue the pretense of negotiations
from the Soviet viewpoint.
On the other hand, it may also be noted that the Soviets
probably placed special emphasis on the Pershing II precisely
because West Germany alone was scheduled to receive this
type of missile. The Soviets could thus isolate West Germany
and attempt to play upon its special vulnerabilities. The
extent to which the Soviets truly fear the relatively small
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number of Pershing II's, which are vulnerable to pre-emptive
Soviet attack, is not certain. It is possible that the fears
were exaggerated in an attempt to generate feelings of
hysteria in impressionable sectors of West German opinion.
Soviet countermeasures to the NATO INF deployment were
gradually revealed. The Soviets announced
t
that the moratorium
on SS-20 deployment in the European part of the Soviet Union
(which Western governments said was never observed anyway)
had been lifted. Controversial as the U.S. forward-based
systems were during the INF negotiations, the Soviets decided
to respond to the land-based Pershing II and cruise missile
deployment with more FBS systems of their own: additional
missiles on submarines off the coast of the United States
[Ref . 92: pp. 1 and 4] . Of more immediate importance to
the West Germans, although not unexpected, has been the
installation of additional shorter-range SS-21's, SS-22*s,
and SS-23's in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. It is
generally felt, however, that this deployment of shorter-range
nuclear missiles is the continuation of a long-planned
modernization and scarcely counts as a response to the NATO
INF deployment.
Soviet attempts to influence the West German government
have continued since the breakdown of the negotiations and
have included a letter from Andropov suggesting that the
situation arising from the stationing of the Pershing II's
was not "irreversible." [Ref. 93: p. 1] The Soviet idea of
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"reversible," however, constitutes the removal of NATO
deployments already in place before negotiations can be
reinitiated. The Soviets must have their doubts about their
abilities to influence the current West German conservative
government now that the deployment has already begun, since
they were not successful earlier.
The timing of Soviet announcements on countermeasures
suggests that the Soviets were trying to inject new momentum
into the anti-missile protests [Ref . 92: p. 4] . The anti-
missile movement lost a great deal of momentum after the
deployment began. Even Petra Kelly, founder of the Greens,
has "noticed an incredible weakening of the peace movement,"
[Ref. 94: p. E4] and the NATO decision anniversary and
Easter Week demonstrations drew substantially fewer
demonstrators than prior to the deployment. Indeed, in the
words of Walter Jens, a Tuebingen professor, "In the peace
movement there is a growing criticism of the Soviet Union,"
which is thought to be controlled by its military [Ref. 94:
p. E4] . James Markham suggests that the "peace movement"
is now searching for new themes but has not come up with
anything which could draw a large following as in the
pre-deployment timeframe, and with the employment situation
so critical, enlistment in the Bundeswehr is at an all-time
high [Ref. 94 : p. E4]
.
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Since the deployment the SPD has seen the necessity of
reestablishing its credentials as a supporter of NATO and has
broadened the nuclear weapons issue by proposing an
accelerated removal of tactical nuclear weapons from the
Federal Republic, a drawdown of the chemical weapons inventory,
and the creation of a nuclear-free zone on each side of the
West German-East German border. Left-wingers, like Oskar
Lafontaine, who has called for the Federal Republic's
withdrawal from NATO, have been disparaged, even by those SPD
members who also opposed the deployment. Thus, it appears
that Karl Kaiser's analogy of the SPD to a pendulum is
accurate; after a swing to the left, the pendulum is moving
back closer to the center, which might be viewed as
discouraging to the Soviets. [Ref. 95: p. 3]
The European Parliament elections (though less important
in practical terms than national elections) in June 1984
revealed that the Greens, now concentrating more on environ-
mental themes and playing down the pacifist issues, were
gaining in support. With 8.2% of the vote, which is a gain
of almost 3% since the March 1983 West German elections,
the party appears to be gaining in popularity. The current
success of the Greens might be seen as encouraging for the
Soviets, who have perceived them as a receptive audience in
the past which would be sympathetic to future Soviet arms
control initiatives. [Ref. 96: p. 3]
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Meanwhile, the FDP failed to get the 5% of the popular vote
necessary for reelection to the European Parliament and thus
can be considered as a party in decline. Since its switch of
allegiance to the CDU/CSU, the FDP lost many of its supporters,
particularly among the young. In an attempt to stem the
exodus from the. party, Hans-Dietrich Genscher has declared he
will step down early next year from the party leadership.
This would clear the way for younger leaders and hopefully
help the party regain some popularity. [Ref. 100: p. 3]
While the negotiations were ongoing, Soviet leaders
threatened the West Germans with various consequences. As
noted previously, some of these consequences had already
been, or were in the process of being, implemented, e.g.,
deployment of intermediate-range missiles directed toward
West Germany and modernized short-range missiles in East
Germany. However, they were emphasized because of their
propaganda effect. Other threatened consequences were more
nebulous, e.g., making the risk of war more probable if NATO
INF were deployed, but threats like this could be readily
disbelieved since they sounded like traditional Soviet
rhetoric
.
It is doubtful that the Soviets would ever consider
economic sanctions against the West Germans as they need
the hard currency and the technology. In 1983 the Soviet
Union increased its trade with Western Europe by 6.4%
[Ref. 98: p. 31], Even before the INF negotiations were
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discontinued, at the German-Soviet Economic Commission meeting
in Moscow in early November 1983, the Soviets promised to
"make every effort to expand our economic cooperation" and
pressed the West Germans to buy more natural gas [Ref. 99:
p. 77] . The Federal Republic is also a major supplier of
industrial and farm machinery and equipment. Thus, it
appears that the Soviets value economic benefits highly
enough to maintain the economic relationship with West Germany
There has been no move at all to diminish trade with Western
Europe, including the Federal Republic of Germany.
Those in the Federal Republic who feared a worsening of
relations with East Germany have also had their minds set at
rest. Since the NATO deployment began, East German party
leader Erich Honecker has assured the West Germans that he
would not allow relations between the two Germanys to
deteriorate. The East Germans reciprocated a DM one billion
loan to East Germany in June 1983 with the largest number of
East Germans allowed to emigrate to West Germany since the
Berlin wall was built in 1961— some 30,000 thus far in 1984.
Intra-German trade has become very important for the East
Germans, who, by trading with the West Germans, have enjoyed
the benefits of being a de facto member of the European
Economic Community. With a hard-currency debt of $7.9
billion, East Germany needs the West German credits to service
its loans [Ref. 100: p. 3] . Honecker has also recently lifted
the minimum currency exchange requirement for children under
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fourteen years of age travelling to East Germany, although the
West German government feels he needs to go further after
almost doubling the exchange requirement to DM 25 per day in
1980 and refusing to exempt pensioners and children [Ref.
101: p. J3]. Most recently, in July 1984, another loan for
^$340 million to East Germany has been guaranteed by Bonn
[Ref. 102: p. 12] .
Honecker apparently feels he has more to gain by remaining
on good terms with the Federal Republic. Maintaining an
autonomous line from Moscow on the INF issue, Honecker
asserted that the new Soviet shorter-range missiles brought
"no joy" to the East Germans. As James Markham has observed:
By pressing for better relations with Bonn immediately after
the stationing of the first Pershing 2 missiles in West
Germany, the East German [Honecker] has destroyed the Soviet
propaganda theme that ties between East and West Germany
would be blocked by 'a palisade of rockets 1 rising between
the two states. [Ref. 103: p. 4]
In conclusion, there is no evidence that Soviet-West
German relations have been permanently harmed by the GLCM
and Pershing II deployment. Negative Soviet rhetoric will
continue, but the Soviets realize they will have to deal with




From the inception of the NATO decision to modernize
its INF, the Soviet Union has exercised phenomenal efforts to
prevent the deployment of the GLCM ' s and Pershing II 's in
West Germany. As previously noted, the Soviets professed to
fear the latter missiles much more than the cruise missiles
because of their short flight time. To this end the Soviets
waged a campaign of threats, exaggerations, misrepresentations,
and lies in order to impress the West Germans with Soviet
vulnerability and peaceful intentions.
The Soviet campaign against the NATO deployment was
unsuccessful, but the Federal Republic of Germany was polarized
around the deployment issue. On the one hand, the Greens and,
later, the SPD opposed the deployment, thereby repudiating
former Chancellor Schmidt's support for the decision, while
the CDU/CSU and FDP supported it. An anti-missile movement
was able to mobilize thousands of people from assorted groups,
and opinion polls suggested that the government elected in
March 1983 was no longer supported by the majority of the
West Germans, at least on the NATO deployment issue. After
a heated debate in the Bundestag, the government approved the
implementation decision by a narrow margin. What had once
been a government and opposition defense consensus no longer
existed. Or did it?
71
1984 has seen the move back toward the center by the SPD
and a surge in popularity of the Greens after they decided to
become more than just a one-issue party, i.e., anti-missile
deployment. The "peace movement" has stagnated and no longer
draws the large crowds at demonstrations that it once did.
Although the West German government had now done precisely
the thing that the Soviet Union said would cost them much in
detente, it was the Kremlin's turn to decide that it was really
the Soviet Union that needed Ostpolitik , trade, and Western
technology. East Germany as well was not willing to give up
the gains it had made under Ostpolitik and appreciated the
short-range SS-21's, SS-22's, and SS-23's stationed on
East German territory as little as the West Germans did.
The Soviet Union, of course, will continue to pressure
the West Germans not to accept the full complement of Pershing
II's and cruise missiles, though they may realize the chances
of this are not that great. But the Soviets also realize they
have to cooperate with the conservative Kohl government for
the next few years and will have to do so in order to maintain
their mutually beneficial economic ties.
While the Soviets have suffered a setback in prestige by
not being able to prevent the NATO deployments, they must
have a certain amount of satisfaction that their propaganda
campaign did generate so much polarization and dissension.
Although the situation in the Federal Republic has become
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much more subdued since November 1983, it will undoubtedly
be difficult in the future to implement any further nuclear
arms modernization. The public consciousness has been
raised, and any future attempts to extend the range of the
Pershing II, increase its numbers, MIRV its warheads, or
provide reloads in order to keep pace with further SS-20
deployments will most assuredly be met with stiff resistance—
to say nothing of nuclear modernization in other areas, such
as enhanced radiation battlefield weapons. Meanwhile, the gap
in intermediate-range warheads in Europe will widen to the
advantage of the Soviets
.
Perhaps the Soviets did not do so badly after all; they
may have lost the battle to prevent NATO's INF deployment,
but they may continue to hope to erode NATO's will to resist
Soviet attempts to achieve political hegemony. At the least,
the USSR may remain confident of retaining and enhancing its
nuclear superiority in Europe, partly because it will be most
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